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Abstract
Crowdsourcing offers unprecedented potential for solving tasks effi-
ciently by tapping into the skills of large groups of people. A salient
feature of crowdsourcing—its openness of entry—makes it vulnerable to
malicious behavior. Such behavior took place in a number of recent popu-
lar crowdsourcing competitions. We provide game-theoretic analysis of a
fundamental tradeoff between the potential for increased productivity and
the possibility of being set back by malicious behavior. Our results show
that in crowdsourcing competitions malicious behavior is the norm, not
the anomaly—a result contrary to the conventional wisdom in the area.
Counterintuitively, making the attacks more costly does not deter them
but leads to a less desirable outcome. These findings have cautionary
implications for the design of crowdsourcing competitions.
1 Introduction
Numerous successful examples of the power of crowdsourcing to solve problems
of extreme difficulty [1–14] have overshadowed important episodes where elabo-
rate sabotage derailed or severely hindered collective efforts. The winning team
in the DARPA Network Challenge obtained the locations of the ten balloons af-
ter spending significant efforts filtering the majority of false submissions, includ-
ing fabricated pictures containing individuals in disguise impersonating DARPA
officials [15]. A team from the University of California at San Diego lost its lead
in the DARPA Shredder Challenge after their progress was completely wiped-out
by a relentless number of coordinated overnight attacks [16,17]. The team that
topped the US Department of State sponsored Tag Challenge had to withstand
a smear campaign orchestrated in Twitter aimed at reducing its credibility [10].
Beyond crowdsourcing competitions, Ushahidi’s collective conflict mapping for
the Arab Spring had to be shut down for long periods of time due to suspicions
that it had been infiltrated by government officials [16]. This fragility of crowd-
sourcing can also be used in a positive manner: targeted attacks can exploit the
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fragility of decentralized, hierarchical recruitment of on-line extremists, effective
slowing down their radicalization and training process [18].
These episodes have received a response in the form of emerging work at the
intersection of the computer and economic sciences. Recent results in this area
have elucidated that it is possible to design incentive structures and algorithmic
strategies to modify the efficacy and quality of the crowdsourced solution, the
vulnerability of crowdsourcing to malicious behavior, and the cost of undertak-
ing it [19–42]. These three factors can attain a wide variety of values depending
on the particularities of the problem at hand, the economic incentives at stake,
as well as the algorithmic platform supporting the collective effort. For instance,
the combinatorial nature of puzzle-assembly in the DARPA Shredder Challenge
makes the solution very vulnerable to an attack at a low cost—destroying puz-
zle progress is much easier than creating it. On the other hand, fabricating a
false balloon sighting in the DARPA Balloon Challenge is costly, as it involves
a certain degree of counterintelligence skills, more so when individuals posing in
false submissions risk identifiability—while at the same time, a false submission
does not affect the validity of the other submissions.
In this paper, we propose a formal analysis to explore the efficacy-vulnerability
tradeoff of crowdsourcing. We adopt a scenario where two firms (players) com-
pete against each other to obtain a better solution to a task which can be
crowdsourced. Our goal is to understand whether malicious behavior exempli-
fied above is the norm or the anomaly, i.e. whether we should expect players
to undertake attacks on the collective progress of competing players. We con-
sider the cost of attacking a crowdsourcing strategy, and investigate the effect of
higher costs on behavior of the players. We also aim at quantifying how this ma-
licious behavior affects the likelihood of using crowdsourcing as a strategy, and
ultimately how it impacts the social welfare under collective problem solving.
Such an understanding will be helpful for the design of future crowdsourcing
competitions, as well as support the decision process of institutions and firms
considering crowdsourcing.
Our main finding is that making attacks more costly perhaps by making
it more difficult to attack, does not deter the attackers and results in a more
costly and less efficient equilibrium outcome. Paradoxically, making the cost of
attacking zero is best for the players. This suggests that care should be used
when attempting to discourage attacks by raising the cost. In situations where
damage from attacking is high, the incentive to attack is very strong. Instead,
crowdsourcing competitions are more suited for scenarios where damage inflicted
by an attack is low.
In the next section, we present a model for studying the tradeoff between
higher productivity offered by crowdsourcing and the increased vulnerability
that comes with it. Then, we derive equilibrium of the game defined by the
model. We pay particular attention to the case where both players choose to
crowdsource and investigate the players’ incentives to attack. We also analyze
how the cost of an attack and the damage from the attack affect the incentives
of players to crowdsource.
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2 Model
We study a non-cooperative situation where two players (or firms) compete to
obtain a better solution to a given task. The firm with the better solution
wins and receives a reward of R. Each firm can develop an in-house solution
or crowdsource the task. The former is referred to as the closed strategy, the
latter—as open. We focus on scenarios where open strategies are likely to be
more efficient even though the exact level of efficiency is not known until after
a firm engages in crowdsourcing—this reflects a high level of uncertainty un-
derlying engagement processes in social networks [43–50]. Also, open strategies
are susceptible to attacks: a firm using an open strategy can be attacked by the
competing firm. The resulting damage from the attack impairs the other firm,
and may let the attacking firm win.
To investigate the tradeoff between higher efficiency of crowdsourcing and
vulnerability to attacks, we propose a model that isolates these two factors. In
our model, a firm decides whether or not to crowdsource, and whether or not
to attack the competitor. The nature of a crowdsourcing strategy is that it is
observable by everyone including the competitors. If the competitor chooses
to crowdsource, the opponent would observe it, and can decide whether or
not to attack. Notice that the decisions are sequential: the decision about
crowdsourcing is made first, while the decision about attacking is made second.
We will model this interaction as a sequential game.
Formally, we have a two-stage game. In the first stage, the firms decide
whether to solve the task in-house S or to crowdsource it C. Then the efficiencies
of the firms that chose to crowdsource are observed. Due to the open nature of
crowdsourcing, the efficiency, or productivity, of a crowdsourcing strategy used
by player i becomes known not just to the crowdsourcing player but also to
the opponent. We use Pi for the random variable denoting the productivity
and pi for its realized value. The productivity of the in-house solution is fixed
and normalized to zero. We assume that the productivity of a crowdsourcing
strategy is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1: Pi ∼ U [0, 1]. In the absence
of attacks, the firm with a higher productivity wins.
The assumption that the productivity of a crowdsourcing firm is publicly
known is consistent with competitions such as the Network Challenge and the
Shredder Challenge. In the Shredder Challenge, the current progress of each
competitor was publicly known. In the Network Challenge, the effectiveness of
a crowdsourcing strategy could be estimated through the social media impact
generated by a crowdsourcing team.
In the second stage, the players decide whether or not to attack the oppo-
nent (attacking is denoted by A and not attacking by N). An attack is costly,
and the cost q ∈ (0, 1) is expressed as a fraction of the total reward R. This
cost can represent a range of situations: the human effort in disrupting the
opponent’s solution; the complexity of creating multiple identities to carry out
a Sybil attack; financial punishment received when the attack is detected in a
crowdsourcing competition. The damage inflicted by the attack is denoted by
d ∈ (0, 1), which determines how much productivity is taken away from the open
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strategy (equivalently, how much more productive the attacking firm becomes
after “stealing” the crowdsourced solution). The firm that has a higher produc-
tivity at the end of the second stage wins the prize R, which is normalized to
be R = 1. The parameters q and d are publicly known. We characterize the
equilibrium of this two-stage game as a function of these parameters.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
We find the subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game. Each pair
of players’ decisions made in the first stage (to crowdsource or not) result in a
different second-stage game. We first analyze each second-stage game (to attack
or not). Based on these, we then analyze how decisions are made in the first
stage.
When both players use an in-house strategy S, there is no reason to attack,
and they both choose N in the second stage. Each one is equally likely to win
and the expected utility of each is 12 . We note this in the SS cell of the payoff
matrix in Table 1.
When player 1 crowdsources and player 2 does not, player 1 has no reason
to attack, but player 2 attacks if doing so puts him ahead of player 1. Player 2
attacks if the realized productivity of player 1 is less than the damage p1 < d
player 2 can inflict. Recall that we normalized productivity of an in-house
solution to zero. The ex-ante utility of player 1 before his productivity is realized
is 1 − d: i.e., he receives the payoff of 1 when his productivity is high enough
to not be attacked, which, for uniformly distributed productivity, happens with
probability 1 − d. The ex-ante utility of player 2 before the productivity of
player 1 is realized is d(1 − q): i.e., the productivity of player 1 is low enough
to be overtaken after an attack (which happens with probability d), so player
2 attacks and receives the reward minus the cost: 1 − q. Note that player 2
attacks for any cost of an attack q ∈ [0, 1): attacking brings a positive utility
while not attacking results in zero utility. The case when player 2 crowdsources,
and player 1 does not is symmetric. We summarize this in the CS and SC cells
of the payoff matrix in Table 1.
The most interesting case is when both players crowdsource. Let p1 and p2
denote their productivities, which are known before they decide on attacking.
Consider the case when p1 > p2. The other case is symmetric.
If the difference in productivities p1 − d > p2 of the players is so large that
the attack by player 2 does not let her reach player 1, then attacking does not
change the outcome and neither player attacks. In this case, player 1 receives
the utility of 1, while player 2 receives the utility of 0.
3.1 Crowdsourcing and Attacking
We analyze the game when both players crowdsource and a unilateral attack by
the weak player (i.e., player 2) will bring him ahead of the strong player (i.e.,
player 1). This is the case when p1 − d < p2. In this case, player 2 would like
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to attack if player 1 does not. At the same time, player 1 would like to attack
in order to keep its lead only if player 2 is attacking. Consequently, there is no
pure strategy equilibrium of this game. The payoff matrix showing utilities for
each player appears below.
A N
A 1− q,−q 1− q, 0
N 0, 1− q 1, 0
The game possesses a unique mixed equilibrium. Let l1, l2 denote the proba-
bilities that, respectively, player 1 and 2 attacks. For player 1 attacking results
in the expected utility of
l2(1− q) + (1− l2)(1 − q) = 1− q (1)
while non-attacking gives the expected utility of
l2 · 0 + 1 · (1− l2) = 1− l2. (2)
In a mixed equilibrium, a player’s expected utility from choosing either action
must be the same. This is satisfied for player 1 when
1− q = 1− l2 (3)
that is for l2 = q. Similarly, for player 2 the expected utility from attacking is
l1(−q) + (1 − l1)(1− q) = 1− q − l1. (4)
The expected utility from not attacking is 0, yielding the equilibrium condition
l1 = 1− q.
Thus, in the mixed equilibrium, player 1 attacks with probability l1 = 1−q, and
player 2 attacks with probability l2 = q leading to the following observation.
Finding 1 The higher the cost, the more likely the weak player (i.e., player 2)
is to attack and the less likely is the strong one.
This behavior contradicts the intuition that making attacks more costly
helps prevent them: that is, the higher it is to attack, the less should either
player attack. We explain why this does not hold by looking into the reasons
for players’ attacks. Player 1 attacks only to counteract a possible attack of
player 2. Player 2 attacks in the hope that the attack is not counteracted by
player 1 allowing player 2 to get ahead. Crucially, the incentive of player 1 to
attack increases in the likelihood that player 2 attacks, while the incentive of
player 2 to attack decreases in the likelihood that player 1 attacks.
The cost of attacks increases the likelihood that player 2 attacks because
player 1 attacks less when the cost is higher. Whenever both players attack,
player 1 wins with certainty, and player 2 would have preferred to avoid the
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useless and costly attack. Thus, the less player 1 is likely to attack (i.e., the
higher the cost), the more eager player 2 is to attack. For example, when
attacking is free, player 1 always attacks and always wins obtaining the utility
of 1. When the cost is the same as the prize, q = 1, player 2 always attacks
taking the prize away from player 1 who does not attack resulting in zero utility
for both. This means that the higher the cost of an attack, the more likely is
the weak player to win!
Finding 2 Instead of protecting the better crowdsourcing strategy, a higher cost
of an attack results in the weaker strategy winning after a unilateral attack.
This is a striking observation. Making attacks more costly should help the
society by ensuring the stronger strategy wins. This does not occur as, due to
the higher likelihood of agent 2 attacking, the weaker player attacks and wins.
Furthermore, the players spend more resources on attacking each other: making
attacks more costly results in a lower total utility of the agents. To show this, we
first notice that the expected number of attacks does not change with the cost
of an attack. Raising the cost result in fewer attacks by the strong player and
in more attacks by the weak player: the weak player attacks with probability q
and the strong player attacks with probability 1− q.
Finding 3 The expected number of attacks is one regardless of the cost of an
attack q.
A direct consequence is the following:
Finding 4 Increasing the cost of an attack decreases (not increases) the total
utility of the agents.
We now look at the competition from the point of view of what is socially
optimal. We measure the benefit to the society as the total utility of the players
and the final quality of the solution. We refer to it as social welfare. Combining
Findings 2 and 4, we conclude that:
Finding 5 Increasing the cost of an attack results in a lower social welfare.
This finding suggests that increasing the cost of an attack is damaging rather
than helping. Setting the costs to zero would be optimal from the social welfare
point of view: the strong player would attack and win with probability 1, the
weak player would not attack, and the cost of attacking would be zero.
Finding 6 Free attacks maximize the social welfare.
We now turn to the analysis of players’ utilities. From (1) or (2), the expected
utility of the strong player is 1 − q, while from (4), the expected utility of the
weak player is 0. Observe the equilibrium strategy requires that the weak player
obtains the same utility from both actions: i.e., the strong player selects her
action so that attacking by the weak player gives exactly zero expected utility.
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3.2 To Crowdsource or Not
The expected utilities discussed above are for the game played in the second
stage after productivities become known and for the case when p1 − d < p2.
We now take a step back and compute expected utilities when both players
crowdsource but before the productivities become known. To avoid confusion
we refer to these utilities as ex-ante utilities. The ex-ante utility of player 1
(and symmetrically of player 2) is
u1 = Pr(P2 < P1 < P2 + d)(1− q) + Pr(P2 + d < P1).
The first term corresponds to the utility of player 1 in the mixed equilibrium of
the game described above, and the second term corresponds to player 1 winning
with certainty when player 2 cannot reach him even after attacking. Under the
assumption that P1 and P2 are uniformly distributed between zero and one, we
derive
Pr(P2 < P1 < P2 + d) =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
1{p2<p1<p2+d}dp2dp1
=
∫ 1
0
∫ min(p2+d,1)
p2
1dp1dp2
=
∫ 1
0
(min(p2 + d, 1)− p2)dp2
=
∫ 1−d
0
d dp2 +
∫ 1
1−d
(1− p2)dp2
= (1− d)d+ (1−
1
2
)− (1− d−
(1− d)2
2
) = d−
d2
2
Pr(P2 + d < P1) =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
1{p2+d<p1}1dp2dp1
=
∫ 1
d
∫ p1−d
0
1dp2dp1 =
∫ 1
d
(p1 − d)dp1
=
1
2
− d− (
d2
2
− d2) =
d2
2
− d+
1
2
The ex-ante utility of either player is
u1 = u2 = (d−
d2
2
)(1 − q) + (
d2
2
− d+
1
2
)1
=
1
2
− (d−
d2
2
)q
The utility of the players decreases in both q and d. At the extreme case
when both q and d are 1, the utility is zero. Whenever either of the parameters
is at its minimum value of zero, the utility is at its maximum value of 12 . Observe
that the ex-ante utility decreases in the cost of an attack. This is a consequence
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C S
C 12 − (d−
d2
2 )q,
1
2 − (d−
d2
2 )q 1− d, d(1 − q)
S d(1− q), 1− d 12 ,
1
2
Table 1: Expected payoff matrix for the crowdsourcing game.
of the number of attacks being independent of q when both p1 − d < p2 as we
noted in Finding 3 and a related Finding 4.
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma [51–54], the unique equilibrium for both players is
to choose the action that hurts the other player: i.e., to defect. In the resulting
equilibrium, both players are hurt. A similar situation (although in mixed
strategies) arises in the crowdsourcing game. Both players choose to attack (in
equilibrium, the expected number of attacks is 1), incurring unproductive costs.
When both players attack, the outcome is the same as when neither player
attacks except that each player incurs the cost of an attack. When only the
strong player attacks, the outcome does not change, but the player incurs the
cost of an attack. When only the weak player attacks, the outcome changes for
a less efficient outcome (the weaker player wins), and the weak player incurs the
cost of an attack. Only when neither player attacks, there is no loss to social
welfare.
Having analyzed the second stage games, we can now describe the entire pay-
off matrix for the game played in the first stage. Note that in the first stage, the
players are unaware of their productivities, should they choose crowdsourcing.
Thus, the payoff matrix contains their ex-ante utilities, depicted in Table 1.
We ask the question of how q and d affect the equilibria. For any choice
of parameters, only CC and SS can be pure strategy equilibria. Higher dam-
age from an attack and low cost of attacking correspond to the crowdsourcing
strategy being more risky. Indeed, as we detail below, for d > 12 and q <
2d−1
d2
,
SS is the only equilibrium strategy. Similarly, when the damage is low and cost
of attacking is high, crowdsourcing dominates, and CC is the only equilibrium
strategy for d < 12 . For the remaining range of parameters d ≥
1
2 and q ≥
2d−1
d2
,
both CC and SS are equilibrium strategies.
Crowdsourcing CC is a unique equilibrium when the damage inflicted by
an attack is low d < 12 . Indeed, when both firms use closed strategies, devi-
ating to a crowdsourcing strategy provides a higher payoff (1 − d > 12 ), as in
expectation the productivity of a crowdsourcing strategy will make the crowd-
sourcing firm outside the reach of the in-house competitor even after being
attacked. Crowdsourcing for one firm and not crowdsourcing for the other is
not stable, as the non-crowdsourcing firm is better off switching to crowdsourc-
ing 12 − (d −
d2
2 )q > d(1 − q). This holds regardless of the cost of an attack
0 < q < 1.
For d ≥ 12 , CC remains an equilibrium only if the cost of an attack is high
enough: q ≥ 2d−1
d2
. Intuitively, players crowdsource when attacking costs a lot
(higher q) and is not effective (lower d).
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In summary, crowdsourcing CC is the unique equilibrium when d < 12 ; in-
house SS is the unique equilibrium for d > 12 and q <
2d−1
d2
; both CC and SS
are equilibrium strategies for d ≥ 12 and q ≥
2d−1
d2
.
How does the cost of an attack influence the likelihood of players to crowd-
source? Intuitively, we would expect that high costs prevent attacks and make
crowdsourcing more appealing. Our model provides reasoning against this in-
tuition. The analysis above reveals that q has a limited affect on the choice
of the equilibrium strategy and for the case when both players crowdsource,
it does not reduce the expected number of attacks. Cost of attacking matters
when the level of damage is high (d ≥ 12 ). In this case, high costs enable CC as
equilibrium, however SS still remains a equilibrium.
The damage from an attack has a stronger effect on the equilibrium. Low
damage corresponds to fewer attacks on a crowdsourcing firm: when both play-
ers crowdsource the likelihood that the strong player is within reach of the weak
player is proportional to the level of damage, Pr(P2 < P1 < P2+d). Crowdsourc-
ing is the unique equilibrium strategy for low levels of damage (d < 12 ). This
leads to a conclusion that competitions where the potential to inflict damage
on a crowdsourcing opponent is low are more likely to promote crowdsourcing
than competitions where a high costs of attacking are used to deter attack.
4 Discussion
Our results bear resemblance to the Prisoner’s Dilemma but paint an even
starker picture. When both players crowdsource (i.e., choose a more efficient
way of performing the task) and are close to each other (specifically, within
the damage inflicted by attacking, as was the case in the DARPA Shredder
Challenge) in terms of solution quality, the expected number of attacks is one
regardless of the cost of an attack. Increasing the cost of an attack offers no
deterrence. Therefore, under our basic model, malicious behavior is the expected
behavior, not the anomaly. Given this result and the examples of malicious
behavior in competitions, more emphasis should be given to the issue. There
has been significant academic interest towards filtering misinformation, however
models of malicious behavior in crowdsourcing scenarios have been absent until
this work.
The finding that raising costs of attack is harmful for the players is striking
and warrants further empirical investigation. Our model predicts that higher
costs of attacks lead to more attacks by the weak player resulting in a higher
probability that the weak player would win. Furthermore, the expected number
of attacks remains the same, resulting in a higher costs incurred by the players on
orchestrating attacks. Confirming these findings in the lab or fiend experiment
is a direction for future work.
We made a number of modeling choices: two firms, perfect observability of
productivities, risk-neutrality of the agents, and provided the analysis for a uni-
form distribution of productivities. These choices were guided by the simplicity
and the goal to isolate the factors relevant to the tradeoff between higher pro-
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ductivity of open strategies and higher vulnerability. Due to the simplicity of
our model, we believe that our results capture the fundamental features of the
tradeoff between the productivity/vulnerability.
We considered the relative performance of the firms while ignoring the ab-
solute quality of the solution. This explains why the highest expected social
welfare is obtained when neither firm crowdsources, and therefore, neither firm
attacks (see the payoff of the (S, S) strategy in Table 1). This is suitable for
many competition settings where only relative performance is important (such
as the aforementioned DARPA Network Challenge, DARPA Shredder Chal-
lenge, or Tag Challenge). Requiring a certain minimum solution quality and
modeling the cost of effort are interesting extensions for future work. For ex-
ample, one could model effort as time required to find a solution, with the time
being inversely related to productivity (e.g., t = 1− p). Competitions may also
mitigate aggression by using reward mechanisms where the reward received by
the winner depends on the global progress of all teams—linking crowdsourcing
games to Public Good Games [55–58].
Repeated encounters in crowdsourcing competitions may provide opportu-
nities for the emergence of a richer set of socially desirable strategies as in the
Iterated Prisoners Dilemma [59–61]. It would also be interesting to study how
the presence of more than two players affects the behavior displayed.
Our results emphasize that despite crowdsourcing being a more efficient way
of accomplishing many tasks, it also a less secure approach. In scenarios of
“competitive” crowdsourcing, where there is an inherent desire to hurt the op-
ponent, attacks on crowdsourcing strategies are essentially unavoidable. We
expect these surprising results derived in our stylized model to hold in a variety
of more complicated scenarios that exhibit the fundamental tension between
openness, efficiency and vulnerability.
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